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Industrial relations is in trouble.  It is in trouble both as a set of institutions and 
practices linked to trade unions and collective bargaining (however broadly defined) and 
as a scholarly endeavor.  The problem is that these institutions are under attack. The 
attack has been especially virulent in the U.S., and particularly successful.  There, trade 
union membership and collective bargaining coverage has fallen from a third of the 
private sector labor force in the early postwar decades to less than 8% today.  For this 
reason, I want to focus on the U.S. here.  But the attack is not confined to the United 
States: Union power has declined to a greater or less extent in most of the industrial 
world.   
The attack is, to be sure, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, part of an effort of 
particular economic and social interests to gain private advantage; and it has succeeded 
through the exercise of raw political and economic power.  But the attack is also 
intellectual, and takes advantage of a weakness of industrial relations as a scholarly 
discipline.  In the past, the discipline has provided an intellectual defence of trade unions 
and a framework in terms of which society, and indeed the unions themselves, could 
understand and justify their existence and deal with the problems that they posed for 
social organization.  In the current period, the discipline no longer seems to provide a 
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viable intellectual framework of this kind.  It has not been able to justify trade unions to 
the larger society.  Nor does it seem to be able to help the unions themselves understand 
their decline.  This paper is addressed to the question of how the intellectual framework 
of industrial relations has failed and how that failure might be remedied. 
As the title of this paper indicates, I had initially thought to do this in terms of the 
transition from “industrial” to “post-industrial” society—recognizing of course that the 
terms themselves are a shorthand for a series of changes that need to be much more 
carefully specified if we are to speak in a meaningful way to the dilemma with which we 
are concerned here.  And that is indeed one of themes I want to pursue in this paper.  But 
to understand our present dilemma and think through the question of how to respond, I 
think we need to work through two other themes as well.  One of those is the demise of 
the Soviet Empire and with it the threat of communism and, more important, the collapse 
of Marxism as an ongoing intellectual enterprise.  The second is the current economic 
crisis and the way it is shaping the policy debate.  I know – or rather hope and presume – 
that the crisis itself will eventually pass, but I am also quite certain that it will leave a 
lasting intellectual legacy, one which we need to begin to address now if it is not to 
cripple us for some time to come. 
 
Post-Industrial Society 
 But first, post-industrial society:  The basic outline of what I have to say here I 
have already said in collaboration with Sean Safford in an article we published a few 
years ago in Industrial Relations (Piore and Safford, 2006).  Our argument there is that, at 
least in the United States, the industrial relations system reflected a very particular model 
of the world of work and its relation to economic and social life.  The model was one in 
which there was a sharp distinction between the economy and the rest of social life.   In 
this, it was very much consistent with Max Weber’s idea of how modern capitalism 
emerged from traditional society (Weber, 1958).  But it was a much more elaborate 
model than Weber’s.  Not only were the social and the economic realms conceived as 
separate and distinct, each of these two realms was also governed by a single, dominant 
institutional form: the large corporate enterprise in the economic realm; the family in the 
social.  The two institutions were taken to be stable, enduring in time, and well defined, 
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with clear boundaries around them.  The family was represented in the economy by the 
male head and breadwinner and his income was the bridge between the economy and the 
social life.  Hence any conflict between these two realms could be reconciled by 
adjustments in the breadwinners’ terms and conditions of employment.  When these 
workers were then organized into trade unions, such conflicts were resolved in collective 
bargaining through negotiations between the unions and corporate employers.  The 
discipline of industrial relations, which focused on and studied union organization and 
collective bargaining, became the prism through which these conflicts and the process of 
resolving them were understood.   
 What “post-industrial” society means in this context is first and foremost the 
breakdown of the neat separation between the social and economic realms and of the 
institutions of reconciliation.  The enormous increase in female labor force participation 
has undermined the male breadwinner model.  And we have moved into a world in which 
neither the family nor the corporate enterprise are stable, enduring or well defined.  Both 
of these institutions now regularly break apart and reemerge in surprising and seemingly 
unpredictable ways.   
In the economy, firms which once seemed to occupy a well-defined and 
permanent place in the industrial landscape – like IBM, specializing in office equipment, 
AT&T the U.S. telephone monopoly, Motorola a radio company, or Kodak focusing on 
photography – now find themselves competing with each other, and with new players 
such as Microsoft and Google, in an industry that seems to produce commodities that 
perform all of these functions at once.  Indeed, the very term commodity seems 
anachronistic; we do not know exactly what to call the objects which this new hybrid 
industry produces.  And, in a further break with the traditional industry structure, these 
same companies have also begun to sell services, ranging from accounting and 
entertainment to email and web browsers, which actually compete with the physical 
objects they sell and which set them up for mergers with companies even further removed 
from their “core competencies” (another term whose popularity in the business literature, 
in seeming to contradict these very trends, underscores how much trouble we are having 
understanding what is taking place around us).   In the social realm, wives who were once 
dependent on their husbands for support are now free to leave them and able to support 
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themselves; children move back and forth between their separated parents in households 
that each parent has formed with new partners.  And male breadwinners leave the women 
whom they may or may not have married to form relationships with each other, and with 
children they may have adopted from half-way-around the world.  Social identities 
signaled by sex, race, ethnicity, age, physical disability and sexual orientation often 
trump identities anchored in the workplace as axes of political mobilization, and 
organizations representing groups defined in these ways make demands in the workplace 
which can only be understood in the larger social context of which work has become a 
part.  Work, in other words, is no longer in a separate and distinct realm, the emergence 
of which Weber imagined heralded economic development. 
A discipline which seeks to help us understand the interrelationship between the 
economy and society thus can no longer focus only upon the intersection created by 
collective bargaining.  It needs to go much deeper and more fundamentally into the 
details of the economy on the one hand and the society on the other.  Many of us have 
tried to do this (see, for example, Kochan, 2005), but the tools which helped us to 
understand collective bargaining are not really adequate to this task.  Indeed, one has to 
wonder whether they have any relevance at all to the inner workings of the two realms 
whose intersection was once their domain of study. 
Some questions to consider in the realm of public policy:  Is the enterprise or the 
establishment an institution to which one can attach employment rights or are they 
merely ephemeral sites of production?  If one cannot attach employment rights to them or 
make them responsible for working conditions, is there some economic unit which can be 
made responsible for the terms and conditions of employment?  What is a living wage in 
a family where at least two members are more or less permanently attached to the labor 
force?  Indeed, is the family the right unit to think about in terms of income adequacy?  
Can you force the family or the firm to be responsible socially or economically for the 
people associated with it?  These policy questions lead to parallel questions in terms of 
scholarship: Should we be studying the firm or the family at all?  Is there some other 
institution or constellation of institutions which we ought to take as our unit of analysis?   
 
The Marxist Alternative 
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 The second factor which seems relevant in understanding the decline of industrial 
relations is Marxism: the role which Marxism played in the emergence of the discipline 
in the first place and now the way in which it too has declined as an intellectual 
enterprise.  Indeed, I find it hard not to see the fate of the two intellectual endeavors as 
intertwined.  From the late nineteenth until the late twentieth centuries, industrial society 
was faced with a problem that was euphemistically called industrial peace.  Industrial 
peace, or rather the lack thereof, became a persistent feature which could not be made to 
go away and posed a continuing threat of anarchy, if not revolution.  The dominant social 
science theories, particularly standard economics, were unable to recognize the problem 
let alone address it—the forces which generated it had no place within their conceptual 
framework.  The instinctive response was to suppress the proximate cause, trade unions, 
as one would repeal a tariff that impeded free trade, or break up a monopoly that 
dampened competition, a prescription which in the case of unions only aggravated the 
problem.  Marxism offered a conceptual tool kit for thinking about these issues, but at the 
price of an ideology of revolution.   
 Industrial relations offered an alternative.  It recognized the problem of industrial 
peace as being central in the formulation of economic policy and provided a vocabulary 
for talking about it and a conceptual framework for thinking about it that seemed to avoid 
the Marxist outcome.  The collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the threat it posed, has 
obviously undermined the appeal of Marxism and with it the perceived need for and 
attraction of the alternative which industrial relations offered.  In the United States, the 
decline of strike activity has obviously diminished the need as well—although the 
protests in France and Greece in 2010-2011 suggest that this is not universally true.  But, 
in understanding the decline of industrial relations as a scholarly endeavor, the more 
important development is that the emergence of post-industrial society has undermined 
the intellectual credibility of Marxism in much the same way it has undermined the 
credibility of industrial relations. 
 Just how much so was driven home to me in a very personal way by my cousin 
when he called several years ago to ask me if I would like to look through my 
grandfather’s papers, which he had inherited, before he donated them to the New York 
Public Library.  My grandfather was manager of the Jewish Daily Forward, a Yiddish 
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language newspaper which up until the 1950’s had a daily circulation of over 150,000 
and was published simultaneously in New York, Chicago and on the West Coast.  And I 
did indeed think it would be interesting to look through them.  It actually was not quite as 
interesting as I had anticipated.  My grandfather, who was born in Russia and came to the 
States as an adolescent, was a Menshevik, a term evoked almost daily with multiple 
meanings in my parents’ household, but which my own children would not recognize at 
all.   The Forward was a socialist newspaper, a key organ of the Jewish socialist 
movement, but by the 1950’s Yiddish was a dying language and the socialist movement 
had been progressively absorbed into the Democratic Party to the point where it really no 
longer had an independent existence.  There is a sense in which Marxism had died in the 
U.S. long before the demise of the Soviet Empire or the coming of post-industrial society.  
Most of my grandfather’s papers consisted of “orations” he had prepared for the funerals 
of old comrades—in fact they were really all variations of the same speech.  I can 
remember hearing it when I went with him to one of these funerals.  But among the 
papers was something I had never heard him talk about before, a pamphlet called the 
Conditions of Jews in Poland (Kahn, c. 1935).  It was a report of a mission he led for the 
Joint Distribution Committee that had been sent to Poland in the early thirties to review 
the programs that the organization ran there.  The JDC was originally founded to help 
Jewish refugees in Europe in World War I, but it then expanded its mission to help Jews 
more generally (really I suppose poor Jews, but in those days most Jews were poor).  
 The pamphlet started from the proposition that the social identity that really 
mattered was class.  It took pains to point out that the brutal anti-Semitism to which the 
Jews were subject in Poland in that period was the product of bourgeois efforts to divide 
the working class, and the Polish workers themselves opposed the violence committed in 
their name.  My grandfather had very little sympathy for Zionism.  Emigration to 
Palestine (or the U.S. for that matter) wouldn’t hurt he argued; it would relieve some of 
the population pressure, but there were so many Jews in Poland and their condition was 
so bad that emigration could never be enough to solve the problem.  The real solution had 
to be found in Poland itself.  Such a solution required that Jews move out of agriculture 
and commerce, which belonged to the historical past, and into manufacturing which 
represented the future.  In this, he clearly had a Marxian vision of the historical trajectory 
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of the system.  The JDC-financed programs in Poland were primarily aimed at helping 
the Jews to do this through education and training.  Another startling feature of the 
pamphlet was the range of programs, which actually went considerably beyond training 
and education for manufacturing and included virtually everything that has been invented 
to address poverty and employment and training beginning, or at least I thought 
beginning, with President Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s, and including a program 
which sounded remarkably like the Grameen Bank.   
 In some ways, the lessons about contemporary society which I drew from the 
reading of my grandfather’s pamphlet are not very different from the lessons about 
industrial relations; neither conceptual framework seems very relevant today.  Even my 
grandfather gave up his class-based orientation in the postwar period, at least by enough 
to make Jewish identity as expressed through the State of Israel a major political 
commitment.  In a way it had already replaced manufacturing, which as a solution to the 
problems of the Jews now seems completely irrelevant.  I am not sure what lessons to 
draw from the fact that in 2010 we still seem committed to the same range of programs 
for fighting poverty as the JDC used in the 1930’s;  perhaps it suggests that our 
understanding of poverty is as irrelevant to the real problem of poverty in contemporary 
society as our understanding of industrial relations. 
 But while Marxism seems no more able to capture the reality of post-industrial 
society than industrial relations, the way in which it fails in this regard is very different.  
Marx actually predicted the fusion of the social and economic realms which seems to 
undermine the construction around which industrial relations was built (he predicted the 
decline of the family as well).  But the impact of these changes has not worked out as he 
foresaw; rather than economic identities coming to dominate social identities, it is more 
like the other way around.  As the employments of women have become more and more 
like those of men, it has increased women’s identity as women and led them to pursue a 
feminist agenda; it has not led women to make common cause in the workplace with 
men.  Post-industrial employment opportunities have become if anything more 
differentiated by the technological trajectory, not as Marx predicted less so.  The 
differences suggest that industrial relations is a good deal more than a tamed version of 
Marxism.  And Marx would seem to provide a more promising starting point for figuring 
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out where we went wrong.  Marx did not focus, as industrial relations did, upon the 
intersection of the social and the economic, but actually tried to get inside and understand 
the dynamics within each realm.  That, it would seem, is where we need to go as well; we 
could begin by trying to understand the errors to which the Marxist framework led and to 
identify the analytical weakness which led it to make them.  This presumably would be a 
very different critique from that which industrial relations theorists made in the 1930’s 
and the immediate post-World War II decades when the field was at its apogee. 
 
The Economic Crisis 
 Finally, the economic crisis: The crisis is to be sure a moving target, especially 
after the resounding defeat of President Obama’s party in the 2010 mid-term 
congressional elections, but however elusive a target it is proving to be, it is one which 
promises to have a decisive impact on industrial relations, both as a practical endeavor 
and as a scholarly enterprise.  We do know, moreover, what the run up to the crisis was 
like.  In the thirty years leading up 2008, social and economic policy had been conceived 
within a neoliberal conceptual framework.  The framework has two key elements: one is 
a theory of human motivation which places exclusive emphasis on individual monetary 
incentives; the other is the competitive market as a template for social and economic 
organization.  This was precisely the framework which precluded an understanding of 
trade union organization and collective bargaining, and which earlier in the century, when 
these were pervasive, had created the space for industrial relations.   
Conventional economics could not explain the persistence of trade union 
organizations and strikes because of the classic free rider problem:  Why should 
individuals be willing to engage in the risky activities of union membership and strike 
when they could have the benefits without paying the costs?  And yet people did engage 
in these activities at great personal risk.  Hence, there was a space for a theory of human 
behavior which admitted a collective motivation.  That space was further enhanced by the 
memory of the Great Depression, the embrace of Keynesian economics as a way of 
understanding that most salient economic event, and with it the acceptance of the 
contradictions between the Keynesian assumption of rigid prices and wages and the 
neoliberal market model in which prices and wages were the instrument of economic 
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adjustment.  As my colleague Duncan Foley once said, the contradictions were forced 
into the labor market, and it thus became convenient to suppose that the labor market 
worked in a radically different way from other markets in the economy, a way which one 
could believe was consistent with industrial relations even if the latter never really tried 
to explain what that was.  As the Great Depression receded from active memory, 
Keynesian economics gave way to much more orthodox economic models, and with the 
decline of union organization the intellectual space for alternatives to the neoliberal 
framework narrowed, indeed one could say virtually disappeared.  The crisis promised to 
reopen that space.   
 The promise of an opening was reinforced by the election of President Obama, 
who rode to office on a coalition of forces opposed to many of the trends which seemed 
to flow from the neoliberal orientation of public policy.  And the crisis itself put into the 
hands of the new Administration the instruments for an altogether different approach to 
economic management.  The Federal government actually took ownership of much of the 
financial services sector and the automobile industry.  This combined with the economic 
stimulus package, and the government’s inherent role in education and health care (and 
the expansion of the Federal role in these areas through new legislation the 
Administration proposed) and traditional government goods and services, to give the 
Obama Administration direct control over half of the economy.  But while policy did 
indeed change in several dimensions, most notably in social and environmental spending, 
the new Administration continued to conceive of what it was doing within the neoliberal 
framework.  Its programs in health, education and energy/environmental policy were 
designed around the template of the competitive market and relied on personal incentives 
based on individualized monetary rewards, even in industries like health and education 
where the practitioners had a strong collective identity and professional ethos which 
might also have served to direct behavior.  My point is not that the market-like incentives 
were wrong, but rather that they were so limited, particularly at a time when budgetary 
constraints (rightly or wrongly) were being stressed.  To take one  particularly telling 
example: when the teachers’ union, at considerable political cost to the leadership and 
after an extensive internal campaign to carry along the rank-and-file, proposed  mixed 
(rather than purely monetary) incentives, it was dismissed as self-interested and treated 
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with ridicule.  We need to recognize and build into our theories the way in which 
people’s identities are embedded in their professions and that they can be motivated to 
work to given standards not simply because they are paid to do so but because if they do 
not then they feel themselves a failure in their own eyes and that of their colleagues 
(Piore, 2010). 
 But the limits of the Administration’s vision are perhaps most evident in its 
failure to develop an incomes policy, particularly in those sectors over which it had direct 
control: most noticeably in terms of the political reaction, in its refusal to control bonus 
payments in the financial services industry.  The Administration insisted on managing the 
assets which it had acquired so as to maximize the financial return, as if the government 
were no more than a private investor.  Numerous proposals to limit bonuses payments in 
the industry were offered by its congressional allies but when they were not vetoed 
openly and outright by the President and his Secretary of the Treasury, they were 
sabotaged in one way or another in the legislative process.  The President himself 
actually opposed the bonuses and attacked industry for offering them in several of his 
public appearances and press conferences, but insider accounts suggest that he viewed his 
own rhetoric in this regard as demagogic and winked at his aides standing in the wings 
even as he spoke from center stage (Alter, 2010).   Thus, he seemed to endorse the trends 
in the U.S. income distribution of the recent decades (1976-2007) in which 58% of the 
growth in income went to the top one percent of the distribution (Atkinson, Piketty, and 
Saez, 2011).  This seems particularly relevant because it contrasts so strongly with the 
1960’s and 1970’s, a period when incomes throughout the distribution rose at roughly the 
same rate, a rate determined by gains in labor productivity (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 
2005; Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2008).  In that period, presidents from Kennedy and 
Johnson to Nixon and Carter all pursued incomes policy of one form or another which 
sought to limit compensation in particular industries, using economy-wide productivity 
gains as the standard.  Those policies were fashioned by a range of economists, from 
Samuelson and Solow at one end of the spectrum of orthodoxy to John Dunlop and 
George Shultz, at the other.  But the intellectual space in which such a policy was 
conceived – Keynesian economics for Samuelson and Solow, industrial relations for 
Dunlop and Shultz – has essentially disappeared.  The one place where the Obama 
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Administration has departed from economic orthodoxy is in its insistence on the need for 
an enormous government stimulus to sustain the economy in a period of recession which 
followed upon a financial crisis of the magnitude of that which the country experienced 
in the fall of 2008.  The justification for the stimulus is, however, basically empirical: 
The recovery falters in virtually every similar crisis about which we have records for the 
last two centuries—actually the standard reference here refers to eight centuries in its title 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  How one could understand the need for this conceptually in 
the framework of liberal economics, i.e., without a theoretical apparatus comparable to 
that offered by Marx or by Keynes, without, in other words, a broader conception of 
human motivation and without something more than the market mechanism to produce 
social cohesion, is another question.  It is not surprising that the Administration has had 
such trouble articulating a justification for its policies within the political arena. 
 Thus, to conclude, the crisis perhaps more than anything else underscores that the 
most pressing task, morally and scientifically, is to fashion a broader conceptual 
apparatus for understanding human activity, one in which, to repeat, human beings are 
more than economic men and society is more than a market.  I think it is basically the 
failure to build such an alternative understanding that is the weakness of industrial 
relations as a scholarly discipline.  But I want also to emphasize that, as I have argued, 
the role that industrial relations played in industrial society never required an 
understanding of this kind.  Indeed, as I tried to suggest, the construction of industrial 
society in which it was embedded essentially skirted this issue.  Marxism is in terms of its 
construction better placed to explore these questions; but the answers it once provided 
are, if not universally wrong, clearly wrong for our times.  Whether, given its ideological 
position, Marxism is able to take advantage of the fact that it was immersed in these 
issues to explore why it was wrong and fashion an alternative is another question.  And I 
certainly do not see in Keynes the roots of serious answers to these issues.  So, I am not 
sure whether this is a direction in which industrial relations is really equipped to move, 
and I have even less of idea as to whether it is likely to go there, but it is definitely the 
direction in which I wish it would move, because somebody has to go there. 
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